Tuesday, April 29, 2014


GCC 4.9 Diagnostics



GCC 4.9 added support for colorizing the warning and error output to make it easier to understand what went wrong during compilation of some source code. This probably wasn't added due to it being a good idea, but because clang has this feature. I'm of the opinion that it's a good idea, but the GCC team probably isn't, as it's not turned on by default, and in order to use this feature you must specify some command line parameters or use some environment variables.

The usage is described as follows: 
-fdiagnostics-color[=WHEN]
-fno-diagnostics-color
Use color in diagnostics. WHEN is ‘never’, ‘always’, or ‘auto’. The default is ‘never’ if GCC_COLORS environment variable isn't present in the environment, and ‘auto’ otherwise. ‘auto’ means to use color only when the standard error is a terminal. The forms -fdiagnostics-color and -fno-diagnostics-color are aliases for -fdiagnostics-color=always and -fdiagnostics-color=never, respectively.
So let's see how much GCC doesn't want you to add this feature. The default is to not show color. There's an option to forcefully turn off color -fno-diagnostics-color. But wait, it gets even better. You read this paragraph and think to yourself: "Hey, all I need to do is add GCC_COLORS to my environment variables and I'll get color, right?" But that's not the case either, as later on the documentation states:
The default GCC_COLORS is ‘error=01;31:warning=01;35:note=01;36:caret=01;32:locus=01:quote=01’ where ‘01;31’ is bold red, ‘01;35’ is bold magenta, ‘01;36’ is bold cyan, ‘01;32’ is bold green and ‘01’ is bold. Setting GCC_COLORS to the empty string disables colors.
Now let's ignore for the moment the complex notation needed for the environment string, and what it claims is the default setting of the environment variable if not specified. There's a logical discrepancy that setting an environment variable in your shell without any data is an empty string, which is then later buried as a final anecdote that an empty string in fact won't show any color!

The best part about all this is that if you mistakenly set GCC_COLORS without specifying any parameters, it overrides the command line parameters -fdiagnostics-color=auto and -fdiagnostics-color=always! Who cares what the documentation says, what sane behavior would be, or what you think all this means, nothing is more important than ensuring you do not have color!

Now that we saw the lengths GCC goes to in order to ensure you won't use colors at all, let's compare the output to clang's.

GCC:

Clang:

The colors seem to be pretty much the same, and shows how hard GCC is trying to copy clang here. However, GCC some time back also added a caret (^) display to show what the warning is referring to, because clang has that. Yet as can be seen from these images, what clang is pointing to is actually useful, while GCC here rather unhelpfully points at the problematic functions, as opposed to what is actually wrong with it.

GCC: 0.
clang: +infinity.

Sunday, April 27, 2014


LibreSSL: The good and the bad



OpenSSL & LibreSSL

OpenBSD recently forked the popular SSL/TLS library OpenSSL into LibreSSL. Most of the reaction to this that I've seen tends to be pretty angry. People don't like the idea of a project being forked, they'd rather people work together, and have the OpenBSD team instead join OpenSSL.

Now, for those of you that don't know it, OpenSSL is at the same time the best and most popular SSL/TLS library available, and utter junk. It's the best because it covers a wide array of the capabilities that exist across the many standards that make up SSL/TLS, and has seen years of development to iron out a multitude of issues and attacks levied against the specifications. The developers also seem to know a lot more about programming than the developers behind some of the competing SSL/TLS libraries. There are a ton of gotchas when it comes to developing an SSL/TLS stack, way beyond other areas of development, and things must be done absolutely correctly.

Cryptographic development challenges

Aside from requiring meticulous programming to avoid typical programming issues and specific problems of the language in question, for SSL/TLS, one also needs to worry about:
  • Ensuring libraries work correctly for tons of cases which are difficult to test for, and where unit tests cannot be exhaustive, and regression testing is far from complete.
  • Work in a completely hostile environment where every single outside variable must be validated by itself, and as part of a larger whole.
  • Data has to be correct both as raw data, and in their particular meaning.
  • Ensure data dependent operations run in actual constant time despite differences in their values to avoid timing attacks.
  • Ensure errors caught aren't actually handled immediately, but only at the very end of the single cryptographic unit as a whole completes, in order to avoid timing attacks. The rest of the unit must function normally despite the error(s).
  • Random data must be taken from an unpredictable source, and random streams must not have any detectable patterns or biases to them.
  • Sensitive/secret data must be protected, without allowing mathematical trickery or the computer environment somehow revealing them. 
  • Ensuring data is wiped clean, without the compiler optimizations or virtual machine ignoring what they deem to be pointless operations.
  • The inability to use some high-level languages because they lack a way to tie in forceful cleanup of primitive data types, and their error handling mechanisms may end up leaving no way to wipe data, or data is duplicated without permission.
  • Almost every single thing which may be the right way of doing things elsewhere is completely wrong where cryptography is concerned.
  • Things still have to be extremely well optimized, otherwise the expenses are too high to be viable in most scenarios.
The above list is hardly exhaustive, and is pretty generic. Various cryptographic algorithms also have a ton of specific issues with them that need to be avoided. These issues are not necessarily specified in the standards, but have been learned over time from those that made mistakes, or by various research.

Some examples of things to avoid which is part of the collective knowledge of SSL/TLS developers:
  • Particular constants with certain algorithms must be avoided.
  • Particular constants with certain algorithms must be used.
  • Certain algorithms don't work well together.
  • Strings must also be handled as raw data.
  • Certain magnitudes are dangerous.
  • Some platforms process certain algorithms or data in a way which must be worked around.
  • Data broken up in certain ways is dangerous.
Now, one can read the specifications and implement them using best software engineering practices, and best cryptographic engineering practices, but where does one learn all the things to avoid? I've read 3 different books which cover how to implement significant parts or all of SSL/TLS, and each one listed unique gotchas that weren't in the other two. They're not mentioned in the various standards, and many of them are far from obvious. Unless you've spent years developing SSL/TLS, and took note of every mistake ever made, you're probably doing it wrong. In fact, most alternative SSL/TLS implementations I've seen make these various mistakes that OpenSSL already learned from.

Who should design cryptographic libraries


In order to create a proper SSL/TLS implementation you need to be a master of:
  • Cryptographic algorithms.
  • Cryptographic practice.
  • Software engineering.
  • Software optimization.
  • The language(s) used.
  • Domain specific knowledge.
Rarely are developers a true master at one of these, let alone being a master of the algorithms and software engineering. Which means most SSL/TLS libraries will either fail at being at the forefront of cryptography or fail nice sane design, or both.

This is also why OpenSSL is utter junk. Some of its developers may have been decent at the algorithms and software engineering, but not particulary good at either of them. Other developers may have been a master of one, but absolutely abysmal at the other. Due to its popularity, OpenSSL is also a dumping ground for every new cryptographic idea, good or bad, and is constantly pushed in every direction, being spread far too thin.

The OpenSSL API for most things is absolutely horrid. No self-respecting software engineer could have designed them. Objects which in reality share a sibling or parent-child relationship are implemented drastically differently, with dissimilar methods to work with them. Methods need to be used on objects in a certain unintuitive order for no apparent reason, or else things break.

The source code under the hood is terrible too. A huge lack of consistency. Operations are done in a very roundabout manner. Issues with one platform are solved by making things worse for all other platforms. Most things are not implemented particularly well. In fact the only thing OpenSSL is particularly good at is being ubiquitous.

Alternatives to OpenSSL

Now, several of the alternatives are much more nicely engineered and with saner APIs. However they all seem to fail basic quality in certain areas. For example, ASN.1 handling is generally written by people who don't know the ins and outs of data structures and best practice and algorithms. If you want good ASN.1, you'll need to have a database design expert to create it for you, not the engineers who are better at cryptography or simple API design. It should also be repeated that nice engineering doesn't equate secure, there's just so much collective messy knowledge which needs to be added.

So now enter the OpenBSD developers, who have a track record for meticulous programming and generally know what they're doing. They're looking to vastly cleanup OpenSSL. I've been waiting for something like this for years. They're going to take the best SSL/TLS library, and going to bring it up to decent engineering standards.

Fixing OpenSSL itself with the OpenSSL team and development structure is really not an option. Since it's a dumping ground, there's no true quality control as needed. Since its main aim is to be ubiquitous, the ancient platforms will inherently be dragging down the modern ones.

LibreSSL progress

So far, the OpenBSD fork of OpenSSL has deleted tons of code. This is crucial, as the more code there is, the more opportunity for bugs. Newbie programmers don't fully understand this point. Newbies think the more verbose some code is, the better. However, more code means more room for mistakes, and it also increases the code size. The more code used in a function, the harder it is to fully comprehend all of it. We humans have limits to how much data we can juggle in our heads. In order to ensure things can be fully conceptualized and analyzed, it has to be as short and as modular as possible. More library usage for similar techniques, and removing similar yet different copies of code littered throughout, as OpenBSD is aiming towards will ensure much higher levels of quality.

OpenBSD is also working to ensure LibreSSL does not contain the year 2038 problem, extending compatibility far into the future. Some of the random method order usage requirements are removed, making development less error prone with LibreSSL. LibreSSL in a very short time is becoming much more lean and more correct than OpenSSL ever was.

LibreSSL pitfalls


However, with the good, there is also bad. LibreSSL is aiming to be compatible with existing software using OpenSSL, which means brain damaged APIs will continue to exist. LibreSSL right now is also being modified to use OpenBSD specific functionality when OpenBSD's existing technology is more secure than what OpenSSL was doing. This means that for the time being, LibreSSL will only work correctly with OpenBSD. Since some functionality won't exist on other platforms, or that the functionality will exist, but not be nearly as secure as OpenBSD's implementation, potentially making ports which seem straight forward to actually be less secure than OpenSSL currently is.

Once I saw what OpenBSD was doing, I predicted to myself that there would be those looking to port LibreSSL to other platforms, and fail to account for all the security considerations. It seems I was right. In just a few short days since LibreSSL's announcement, I'm seeing a multitude of porting projects pop up all over for Linux, Windows, OS X, FreeBSD, and more, all by developers who may know some software engineering, but don't know the first thing about proper cryptographic implementations, or understanding the specific advantages of the OpenBSD implementations.

These porting implementations are failing many of the generic things listed above:
  • Memory wiping is being optimized out.
  • Random values are not being seeded with proper entropy.
  • Random values contain noticeable patterns or bias.
  • Bugs fixed in OpenSSL by switching from generic memory functions to OpenBSD's are being reintroduced by being switched back to generic or naive implementations of the OpenBSD memory functions.
  • Constant-time functions aren't constant on the platforms being ported to.
The developers not understanding what they're doing is why LibreSSL was created in the first place. Unfortunately these porters are not security experts, and are creating or nabbing naive implementations from various sources. They're sometimes also grabbing source from OpenBSD itself or other security focused projects without realizing the source in question is being compiled with certain parameters or with special compilers to gain their security, and the implementation without the same build setup is hardly secure.

As with OpenSSH, in the future, the OpenBSD team will probably be providing a portable LibreSSL. But until then, avoid cheap knockoffs.

LibreSSL future

Will LibreSSL be successful? From what I've seen, it already is. You just may not have it available for your platform at the moment. The API is still crud, and as much as the OpenBSD team is cleaning things up, their code usually could go a bit farther in terms of brevity and clarity. However, the library will undoubtedly be superior to use compared to OpenSSL, and will serve as a much cleaner starting point to document how to create other implementations. Let's just hope the OpenBSD team is or will learn to be as knowledgeable regarding the SSL/TLS algorithms and gotchas as the OpenSSL team was.

Now before you start clamoring to start creating a high level implementation of SSL/TLS, or complaining that C is bad, and it should be written in Java. Consider that it's not even possible to program a secure SSL/TLS library in Java! (Source: Cryptography Engineering page 122).

Saturday, February 15, 2014


HTTP 308 Incompetence Expected



Internet History

The Internet from every angle has always been a house of cards held together with defective duct tape. It's a miracle that anything works at all. Those who understand a lot of the technology involved  generally hate it, but at the same time are astounded that for end users, things seem to usually work rather well.

Today I'm going to point out some proposed changes being made to HTTP, the standard which the World Wide Web runs on. We'll see how not even the people behind the standards really know what they're doing anymore.

The World Wide Web began in the early 90s in a state of flux. The Internet Engineering Task Force, as well as major players like Netscape released a bunch of quasi-standards to quickly build up a set of design rules and techniques used until HTTP v1.0 came out in 1995. Almost immediately after, HTTP v1.1 was being worked on, and despite not being standardized until 1999, it was pretty well supported in 1996. This is around the same time Internet Explorer started development, and a lot of their initial work was basically duplicating functionality and mechanics from Netscape Navigator.

Despite standards and sane way of doing things, implementers always deviate from them, or come up with incorrect alternatives. Misunderstandings, and ideas on how things should work is how things were shaped in the early days.

Thankfully though, over the years, standards online are finally being more strictly adhered to, and bugs are being fixed. Exact precise specifications exist for many things, as well as unit-tests to ensure adherence to standards. Things like Internet Explorer 6 are now a distant memory for most (unless you're in China).

Existing Practice

A key point which led to many standards coming into existence was existing practice. Some browser or server would invent something, and the others would jump on board, and a standard would be created. Those who deviated were told to fix their implementation to match  either the majority, or what was correct and would cause the least amount of issues for the long term stability of the World Wide Web.

Now we'll see how today's engineers want to throw existing practice out the window, loosen up standards to the point of meaninglessness, and basically bust the technology you're currently using to view this article.

HTTP Responses

One of the central designed structures of HTTP is that every response from a server has a code which identifies what the result is, and servers and clients should understand how to work with the particular responses. The more precise the definition, the better online experience we'll all have.

HTTP v0.9 was in a constant state of fluctuation, but offered three basic kinds of page redirects, permanent, temporary, and one which wasn't fully specified and unclear. These were defined as status codes 301, 302, and 303 respectively:

Moved 301: The data requested has been assigned a new URI, the change is permanent.
Found 302: The data requested actually resides under a different URL, however, the redirection may be altered on occasion.
Method 303: Note: This status code is to be specified in more detail. For the moment it is for discussion only. 
Like the found response, this suggests that the client go try another network address. In this case, a different method may be used.

The explanation behind a permanent and temporary redirect seems pretty straight forward. 303 is less clear, although it's the only one which mentions the method used is allowed to change, it's even the name associated with the response code.

Several HTTP methods exist, for different kinds of activities. GET is a method to say, hey, I want a page. POST is a method to say, hey here's some data from me, like my name and my credit card number, go do something with it.

The idea with the different redirects essentially was that 303 should embody your requested was processed, please move on (hence a POST request should now become a GET request), whereas 301 and 302 were to say what you need to do is elsewhere (permanently or temporarily), please take your business there (POST should remain POST).

In any case, the text here was not as clear as can be, and developers were doing all kinds of things in general. HTTP v1.0 came out to set the record straight.

301 Moved Permanently

   The requested resource has been assigned a new permanent URL and
   any future references to this resource should be done using that
   URL. Clients with link editing capabilities should automatically
   relink references to the Request-URI to the new reference returned
   by the server, where possible. 
       Note: When automatically redirecting a POST request after
       receiving a 301 status code, some existing user agents will
       erroneously change it into a GET request. 
302 Moved Temporarily

   The requested resource resides temporarily under a different URL.
   Since the redirection may be altered on occasion, the client should
   continue to use the Request-URI for future requests.
       Note: When automatically redirecting a POST request after
       receiving a 302 status code, some existing user agents will
       erroneously change it into a GET request. 
HTTP v1.0 however did not define 303 at all. Some developers not understanding what a temporary redirect is supposed to be thought it meant hey, this is processed, now move on, however if you need something similar in the future, come here again. We can hardly blame developers at that point for misusing 302, and wanting 303 semantics.

HTTP v1.1 decided to rectify this problem once and for all. 302 was renamed to Found and a new note was added:

      Note: RFC 1945 and RFC 2068 specify that the client is not allowed
      to change the method on the redirected request.  However, most
      existing user agent implementations treat 302 as if it were a 303
      response, performing a GET on the Location field-value regardless
      of the original request method. The status codes 303 and 307 have
      been added for servers that wish to make unambiguously clear which
      kind of reaction is expected of the client.

Since 302 was being used in two different ways, two new codes were created, one for each technique, to ensure proper use in the future. 302 retained its definition, but with so many incorrect implementations out there, 302 should essentially never be used if you want to ensure correct semantics are followed, instead use 303 - See Other (processing, move on...), or 307 Temporary Redirect (The real version of 302).

In all my experience working with HTTP over the past decade, I've found 301, 303, and 307 to be implemented and used correctly as defined in HTTP v1.1, with 302 still being used incorrectly as 303 (instead of 307 semantics), generally by PHP programmers. But as above, never use 302, as who knows what the browser will do with it.

Since existing practice today is that 301, 303, and 307 are used correctly pretty much everywhere, if someone misuses it, they should be told to correct their usage or handling. 302 is still so misused till this day, it's a lost cause.

HTTP2 Responses

Now, in their infinite wisdom, the new HTTP2 team has decided to create problems. 301 status definition now brilliantly includes the following:

      Note: For historical reasons, a user agent MAY change the request
      method from POST to GET for the subsequent request.  If this
      behavior is undesired, the 307 (Temporary Redirect) status code
      can be used instead.

Let me get this straight, you're now taking a situation which hasn't been a problem for over a decade now, and asking it to begin happening anew by now allowing 301 to act as a 303???

If you don't think that paragraph above was problematic, wait till you see this one:

 +-------------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+
 |                                           | Permanent | Temporary |
 +-------------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+
 | Allows changing the request method from   | 301       | 302       |
 | POST to GET                               |           |           |
 | Does not allow changing the request       | -         | 307       |
 | method from POST to GET                   |           |           |
 +-------------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+

301 is allowed to change the request method? Excuse me, I have to go vomit.

It was clear in the past that 301 was not allowed to change its method. But now, I don't even understand what this 301 is supposed to mean anymore. So I should permanently be using the new URI for GET requests. Where do my POSTs go? Are they processed? What the heck am I looking at?

To add insult to injury, they're adding the new 308 Permanent Redirect as the I really really mean I want true 301 semantics this time. So now you can use a new status code which older browsers won't know what to do with, or the old status code that you're now allowing new browsers to utterly butcher for reasons I cannot fathom.

Here's how the status codes work with HTTP 1.1:

+------+-------------------------------------+-----------+-----------------+
| Code | Meaning                             | Duration  | Method Change   |
+------+-------------------------------------+-----------+-----------------+
| 301  | Permanent Redirect.                 | Permanent | No              |
| 302  | Temporary Redirect, misused often.  | Temporary | Only by mistake |
| 303  | Process and move on.                | Temporary | Yes             |
| 307  | The true 302!                       | Temporary | No              |
| 308  | Resume Incomplete, see below.       | Temporary | No              |
+------+-------------------------------------+-----------+-----------------+

So here's how the status codes will work now with the HTTP2 updates:

+------+------------------------------+-----------+---------------+
| Code | Meaning                      | Duration  | Method Change |
+------+------------------------------+-----------+---------------+
| 301  | Who the heck knows.          | Permanent | Surprise Me   |
| 302  | Who the heck knows.          | Temporary | Surprise Me   |
| 303  | Process and move on.         | Temporary | Yes           |
| 307  | The true 302!                | Temporary | No            |
| 308  | The true 301!                | Permanent | No            |
+------+------------------------------+-----------+---------------+



And here's how one will have to do a permanent redirect in the future:

 +------+----------------+----------------+
 | Code | Older Browsers | Newer Browsers |
 +------+----------------+----------------+
 | 301  | Correct.       | Who Knows?     |
 | 308  | Broken!!!      | Correct.       |
 +------+----------------+----------------+

This is how they want to alter things. Does this seem like a sane design to you?

If the new design decisions of the HTTP2 team is to now capitulate to rare mistakes made out there, what's to stop here? I can see some newbie developers reading about how 307 and 308 are for redirects, misunderstanding them, and then misusing them too. So in five years we'll have 309 and 310 as we really really really mean it this time? This approach the HTTP2 team is taking is absurd. If you're going to invent new status codes each time you find an isolated instance of someone misusing one, where does it end?

HTTP 308 is already taken!

One last point. Remember how earlier, I mentioned how a key point for the design of the Internet is to work with existing practice? 308 is in fact already used by something else, Resume Incomplete for resumable uploading. Which is used by Google, king of the Internet, and many others.


Conclusion

I'm now dubbing HTTP 308 as Incompetence Expected, as that's clearly the only meaning it has. Or maybe that should be the official name for HTTP2 and the team behind it, I'll let you decide.

Edit:
Thanks to those who read this article and sent in images. I added them where appropriate.

Tuesday, April 2, 2013


Designing C++ functions to write/save to any storage mechanism



Problem

A common issue when dealing with a custom object or any kind of data is to create some sort of save functionality with it, perhaps writing some text or binary to a file. So what is the correct C++ method to allow an object to save its data anywhere?

An initial approach to allow some custom object to be able to save its data to a file is to create a member function like so:
void save(const char *filename);
While this is perfectly reasonable, what if I want something more advanced than that? Say I don't want the data to be saved as its own separate file, but would rather the data be written to some file that is already open, to a particular location within it? What if I'd rather save the data to a database? How about send the data over the network?

Naive Approach


When C++ programmers hear the initial set of requirements, they generally look to one of two solutions:

The first is to allow for a save function which can take an std::ostream, like so:
void save(std::ostream &stream);
C++ out of the box offers std::cout as an instance of an std::ostream which writes to the screen. C++ offers a derived class std::ofstream (std::fstream) which can save to files on disk. C++ also offers a derived class std::ostringstream which saves file to a C++ string.

With these options, you can display the data on the screen, save it to an actual file, or save it to a string, which you can then in turn save it wherever you want.

The next option programmers look to is to overload  std::basic_ostream::operator<< for the custom object. This way one can simply write:
mystream << myobject;
And then the object can be written to any C++ stream.

Either of these techniques pretty much work, but can be a bit annoying when you want a lot of flexibility and performance.

Say I wanted to save my object over the network, what do I do? I could save it to a string stream, grab the string, and then send that over the network, even though that seems a bit wasteful.

And for a similar case, say I have an already open file descriptor, and wish to save my object to it, do I also use a string stream as an intermediary?

Since C++ is extensible, one could actually create their own std::basic_streambuf derived class which works with file descriptors, and attach it to an std::ostream, which can then be used with anything that works with a stream for output. I'm not going to go into the details how to do that here, but The C++ Standard Library explains the general idea, and provides a working file descriptor streambuf example and shows how to use it with stream functions. You can also find some ready made implementations online with a bit of searching, and some compilers may even include a solution out of the box in their C++ extensions.

On UNIX systems, once you have a stream which works with file descriptors, you can now send data over the network, as sockets themselves are file descriptors. On Windows, you'll need a separate class which works with SOCKETs. Of course to turn a file descriptor streambuf into a SOCKET streambuf is trivial, and can probably be done with a few well crafted search and replace commands.

Now this may have solved the extra string overhead with file descriptors and networking, but what about if I want to save to a database? What about if I'm working with C's FILE *? Does one now have to implement a new wrapper for each of these (or pray the compiler offers an extension, or one can be found online)? The C++ stream library is actually a bit bloaty, and creating your own streambufs is somewhat annoying, especially if you want to do it right and allow for buffering. Many stream related library code you find online are also of poor quality. Surely there must be a better option, right?

Solution


If we look back at how C handles this problem, it uses function pointers, where the function doing the writing receives a callback to use for the actual writing, and the programmer using it can make the writing go anywhere. C++ of course includes this ability, and even takes it much further, in the form of function objects, and even further in C++ 2011.

Let's start with an example.
template<typename WriteFunction>
void world(WriteFunction func)
{
  //Do some stuff...
  //Do some more stuff...
  func("World", 5); //Write 5 characters via callback
  //Do some more stuff...
  unsigned char *data = ...;
  func(data, data_size); //Write some bytes
}
The template function above is expecting any function pointer which can be used to write data by passing it a pointer and a length. A proper signature would be something like the following:
void func(const void *data, size_t length);
Creating such a function is trivial. However, to be useful, writing needs to also include a destination of some sort, a device, a file, a database row, and so on, which makes function objects more powerful.
#include <cstdio>

class writer_file
{
  std::FILE *handle;
  public:
  writer_file(std::FILE *handle) : handle(handle) {}
  inline void operator()(const void *data, size_t length)
  {
    std::fwrite(data, 1, length, handle);
  }
};
Which can be used as follows:
world(writer_file(stdout));
Or perhaps:
std::FILE *fp = fopen("somefile.bin", "wb");
world(writer_file(fp));
std::close(fp);
As can be seen, our World function can write to any FILE *.

To allow any char-based stream to be written, the following function object will do the trick:
#include <ostream>

class writer_stream
{
  std::ostream *handle;
  public:
  writer_stream(std::ostream &handle) : handle(&handle) {}
  inline void operator()(const void *data, size_t length)
  {
    handle->write(reinterpret_cast<const char *>(data), length);
  }
};
You can call this with:
world(writer_stream(std::cout));
Or anything in the ostream family.

If for some reason we wanted to write to strings, it's easy to create a function object for them too, and we can use the string directly without involving a string stream.
#include <string>

class writer_string
{
  std::string *handle;
  public:
  writer_string(std::string &handle) : handle(&handle) {}
  inline void operator()(const void *data, size_t length)
  {
    handle->append(reinterpret_cast<const char *>(data), length);
  }
};
If you're worried about function objects being slow, then don't. Passing a function object like this to a template function has no overhead. The compiler is able to see a series of direct calls, and throws all the extraneous details away. It is as if the body of World is calling the write function to the handle passed to it directly. For more information, see Effective STL Item 46.

If you're wondering why developers forgo function pointers and function objects for situations like this, it is because C++ offers so much with its stream classes, which are also very extensible (and are often extended), they completely forget there are other options. The stream classes are also designed for formatting output, and working with all kinds of special objects. But if you just need raw writing or saving of data, the stream classes are overkill.

C++ 2011


Now C++ 2011 extends all this further in a multiple of ways.

std::bind()


First of all, C++ 2011 offers std::bind() which allows for creating function object adapters on the fly. std::bind() can take an unlimited amount of parameters. The first must be a function pointer of some sort, the next is optionally an object to work on in the case of a member function pointer, followed by the parameters to the function. These parameters can be hard coded by the caller, or bound via placeholders by the callee.

Here's how you would use std::bind() for using fwrite():
#include <functional>
world(std::bind(std::fwrite, std::placeholders::_1, 1, std::placeholders::_2, stdout));
Let us understand what is happening here. The function being called is std::fwrite(). It has 4 parameters. It's first parameter is the first parameter by the callee, denoted by std::placeholders::_1. The second parameter is being hard coded to 1 by the caller. The third parameter is the second parameter from the callee denoted by std::placeholders::_2. The fourth parameter is being hardcoded by the caller to stdout. It could be set to any FILE * as needed by the caller.

Now we'll see how this works with objects. To use with a stream, the basic approach is as follows:
world(std::bind(&std::ostream::write, &std::cout, std::placeholders::_1, std::placeholders::_2));
Note how we're turning a member function into a pointer, and we're also turning cout into a pointer so it can be passed as std::ostream::write's this pointer. The callee will pass its first and second parameters as the parameters to the stream write function. However, the above has a slight flaw, it will only work if writing is done with char * data. We can solve that with casting.
world(std::bind(reinterpret_cast<void (std::ostream::*)(const void *, size_t)>(&std::ostream::write), &std::cout, std::placeholders::_1, std::placeholders::_2));
Take a moment to notice that we're not just casting it to the needed function pointer, but as a member function pointer of std::ostream.

You might find doing this a bit more comfortable than using classical function objects. However, function objects still have their place, wherever functions do. Remember, functions are about re-usability, and some scenarios are complicated enough that you want to pull out a full blown function object.

For working with file descriptors, you might be tempted to do the following:
world(std::bind(::write, 1, std::placeholders::_1, std::placeholders::_2));
This here will have World write to file descriptor 1 - generally standard output. However this simple design is a mistake. Write can be interrupted by signals and needs to be resumed manually (by default, except on Solaris), among other issues, especially if the file descriptor is some kind of pipe or a socket. A proper write would be along the following lines:
#include <system_error>
#include <unistd.h>

class writer_fd
{
  int handle;
  public:
  writer_fd(int handle) : handle(handle) {}
  inline void operator()(const void *data, size_t length)
  {
    while (length)
    {
      ssize_t r = ::write(handle, data, length);
      if (r > 0) { data = static_cast<const char *>(data)+r; length -= r; }
      else if (!r) { break; }
      else if (errno != EINTR) { throw std::system_error(errno, std::system_category()); }
    }
  }
};

Lambda Functions

Now you might be wondering, why C++ 2011 stopped with std::bind(), what if the function body needs more than just a single function call that can be wrapped up in an adapter? That's where lambda functions come in.
world([&](const void *data, size_t length){ std::fwrite(data, 1, length, stdout); });
world([&](const void *data, size_t length){ std::cout.write(static_cast<const char *>(data), length); });
Note the ridiculous syntax. The [](){} combination signifies we are working with a lambda function. The [] receives a function scope, in this case &, which means that the function operates fully within its parent-scope, and has direct access to all its data. The rest you should already be well familiar with. You can change the stdout or the cout in the body of the lambda function to use your FILE * or ostream as necessary.

Let us look at an example of having our World function write directly to a buffer.
#include <cstring>

void *p = ...; //Point p at some buffer which has enough room to hold the contents needed to be written to it.
world([&](const void *data, size_t length){ std::memcpy(p, data, length); p = static_cast<char *>(p) + length; });
There's a very important point in this example. There is a pointer which is initialized to where writing should begin. Every time data is written, the pointer is incremented. This ensures that if World calls the passed write function multiple times, it will continue to work correctly. This was not needed for files above, as their write pointer increments automatically, or with std::string, where append always writes to the end, wherever it now is.

Be careful writing like this though, you must ensure in advance that your buffer is large enough, perhaps if your object has a way of reporting how much data the next call to its save or write function needs to generate. If it doesn't and you're winging it, something like the following is in order:
#include <stdexcept>

class writer_buffer
{
  void *handle, *limit;
  public:
  writer_buffer(void *handle, size_t limit) : handle(handle), limit(static_cast(handle)+limit) {}
  inline void operator()(const void *data, size_t length)
  {
    if ((static_cast<char *>(handle) + length) > limit) { throw std::out_of_range("writer_buffer"); }
    std::memcpy(handle, data, length);
    handle = static_cast<char *>(handle) + length;
  }
};
You can use it as follows:
#include <cstdlib>

size_t amount = 1024; //A nice number!
void *buffer = std::malloc(amount);
world(writer_buffer(buffer, amount));
Now an exception will be thrown if the callee tries to write more data than it should.

std::function

Lastly, C++ 2011 added the ability for more verbose type checking on function objects, and the ability to create the save/write function as a normal function as opposed to a template function. That ability is a general reusable function object facade, std::function.

To rewrite World to use it, we'd do as follows:
void world(std::function<void (const void *, size_t)> func)
{
  //Do some stuff...
  //Do some more stuff...
  func("World", 5); //Write 5 characters via callback
  //Do some more stuff...
  unsigned char *data = ...;
  func(data, data_size); //Write some bytes
}
With std::function, the type is now made explicit instead of being a template. It is anything which receives any kind of buffer and its length, and returns nothing. This can ensure that callers will always use a compatible function as intended by the library designer. For example, in our case, the caller only needs to ensure that data can be passed via a char * and an unsigned char *, based on how World uses the callback function. If World was now modified to also output an int *, less capable callers would now break. std::function can ensure that things are designed properly up front. With std::function, you can now also restructure your code to place various components in different compilation units if you so desire, although perhaps at a performance penalty.

Conclusion

To wrap up, you should now understand some features of C++ that are not as commonly used, or some new features of C++ 2011 that you may not be familiar with. You should now also have some ideas about generic code which should help you improve code you write.

Many examples above were given only with one methodology, although they can be implemented with some of the others. For practice, try doing this yourself. Also try applying these ideas to other kinds of storage mechanisms not covered here, doing so should now be rather trivial for you.

Remember, while this was done with a few standard examples and for writing, it can be extended to all handles Win32 offers, or for reading, or for anything else.

Tuesday, March 19, 2013


OAuth - A great way to cripple your API



Intro

 A few years ago, the big social networking sites were looking for a secure way to allow their users to safely use any and all untrusted software to access their own personal accounts. So that a user could have their account on one social networking site safely interact with their account on another social networking site. They also wanted to allow for users to be able to allow their accounts to interact safely with various untrusted web applications and web sites.

In order to safely allow untrusted software to access a user's account, a few points needed to be kept in mind.
  • Untrusted software should not have access to a user's credentials, in case the software is compromised, passwords will not be stolen, as user's passwords are not stored by the software.
  • Untrusted software should not have full access to a user's account, but only limited access as defined by the user. In the same vein, giving the software user's personal credentials will allow unlimited access to a user's account, which could be used maliciously.
  • A user should be able to revoke the permission they granted to allow particular untrusted software to work, in case they turn malicious, despite the limited access they have.
A solution that was developed for this use-case was created - OAuth. OAuth's primary use-case is the one described above.

Implementation

OAuth is generally implemented in a fashion where the untrusted software is accessed by a user via a standard web browser. In order for a user to authorize that software, the software will redirect the user's browser to a page on the social networking site, with a couple of parameters sent to it. Now that the user is on his social networking site, the untrusted software no longer has control over what the user is doing, as the user left the untrusted software, allowing the user to safely log in to his social networking account. Then, the social networking site will see the parameters it was passed, and ask the user if he or she wants to authorize the software in question, and what kind of access to the user's account it should be given.

If and when the user has authorized the untrusted software, the social networking site can then report back to the untrusted software that it was granted a certain amount of access, and give it some credentials to use. These credentials are unique to the user and the software in question. The social networking site allows for a user to later on see a list of software authorized, and revoke the unique credentials given to any one of them, or modify the amount of access a particular set of credentials has.

Problems

There is no standard

Now above, I said OAuth is generally implemented in this fashion. I say generally, because unlike standard HTTP authentication schemes (Basic, Digest, and others), OAuth is a big grab bag of ideas which can be mixed and matched in an infinite amount of ways, and also allows for developers to make their own unique tweaks to their personal implementations.

With the standard HTTP authentication schemes, once a developer knows the protocol, and implemented it with one web site, that exact same knowledge can be reused to logging into any other web site that supports the standard. Likewise, software libraries can be made to handle HTTP authentication, and all a third party developer needs to do is specify to the library which credentials should be used, and then everything works as expected.

With OAuth, once a developer learns how to authenticate with it to one web site, it is likely that the same developer will need to relearn how to connect to every other web site using OAuth. This further means that every web site which supports OAuth needs to document exactly how it is implementing it, and what tweaks are in use. It also means that no library can be written which can simply support every OAuth implementation out there. This places a great burden on developers on both sides. It can also greatly increase frustration for less able users, when their favorite library works great with one site they support, but are unable to extend their software to another site, because their library lacks some aspect of OAuth for this new site, or a unique OAuth tweak on this new site renders the library incompatible.

Here are some choice quotes from the official RFC:
  • However, as a rich and highly extensible framework with many optional components, on its own, this specification is likely to produce a wide range of non-interoperable implementations.
  • This framework was designed with the clear expectation that future work will define prescriptive profiles and extensions necessary to achieve full web-scale interoperability.

Another issue is that while various standard HTTP authentication schemes have well understood security margins, OAuth is entirely variable. On one web site, its OAuth implementation may be secure, while on another, its implementation may be Swiss cheese. Even though a security consultant should generally look over any authorization implementation to ensure mistakes were not made, laymen can have a good understanding how reliable and secure their standardized authentication scheme is. A manager can ask their developers if some bullet points were adhered to, and then be reasonably confident in their security. Whereas with OAuth, the entire (complex) implementation needs to be reviewed from top to bottom by a top security professional to ensure it is secure. A manager has no adequate set of bullet points to discuss with their developers, as unique implementation details will drastically change the applicability of various points, with many important details still missing. At best, a manager can only get a false sense of security when OAuth is in use. The designers of OAuth respond to this point with a 71 page document of security issues that need to be dealt with!

What all this boils down to, is that OAuth is really just a set of ideas and recommendations on how to implement a unique authorization scheme. OAuth does not allow for interoperability as standards (usually) guarantee. Essentially, OAuth ensures that API authentication with your web site will be confusing, and will only work for the exact use-case for social networking sites described above.

Crippling Design - APUI

The common OAuth use-case described above is to allow for a user on one web site to allow their software to communicate for them with another web site. The workflow described above requires that a user navigate between web sites using their browser and manually enter their credentials and authorization to various aspects of their account as part of the overall software authorization process.

This means that OAuth (at least how it's normally implemented) only works between two web sites, with individual users, and that user intervention is required in order for software to authenticate with another web site. The fact that user intervention is required with manual input means that any API behind OAuth is not an API - Application Programming Interface, but an APUI - Application Programming User Interface, meaning user intervention is required for functionality. All in all, this cripples your API, or APUI as it should now properly be called.

Let us now focus on what cannot be properly done with OAuth in place:
  • Third party software which is not part of a web site cannot interact with an OAuth APUI.
  • One user in third party software cannot act on behalf of another user via an OAuth APUI.
  • Third party software cannot run automated processes on an OAuth APUI.
  • Organizations cannot ensure tight integration between various software and services they use.
Let us review an example case where a company launches a new online service for coordinating schedules and personal calendars between people. We'll call this new online service Calendar. The developers of Calendar create an APUI for it using OAuth, so third party software can integrate with Calendar.

As described above, a user needs to navigate between one web site and another in order to authorize software, with the two web sites sending each other information. What if one wants to integrate something which isn't a web site with Calendar? There's tons of desktop calendaring applications, Microsoft Outlook, Mozilla Lightning, Evolution, KOrganizer, Kontact, and more. If their developers want to integrate with the Calendar service, they need to embed a web browser in their applications now?

Furthermore, that may not even help, if the OAuth workflow requires information be sent to an existing web site, what web site is associated with a user's personal copy of software? Developers of that software are unlikely to create a web site with user accounts just for this integration. Even if they did, if the site goes down (temporarily), then the integration stops working. Even though, in theory, there should be no dependance of some extra web site between Calendar and the software trying to integrate with it.

Insecure

Also, as a security consideration, if an application does embed a web browser in it so it can authenticate with OAuth, the first requirement is no longer met - Untrusted software should not have access to a user's credentials. When using a standard web browser, once a user leaves the third party software's site and redirects to Calendar's site, the third party software cannot steal the information the user is entering. But when the third party software itself is the one which browses to Calendar's site, then it has access to everything the user is entering, including passwords.

Actually, this attack works on OAuth in every circumstance, including web site to web site, and I've actually used it in practice. A web site can embed a web browser via a Java Applet or similar, or have a web browser server side which presents the OAuth log in page to the user, but slightly modified to have all the data entered pass through the third party site. Therefore OAuth doesn't even fulfill its own primary security objective!

Incompatible with Enterprise

Next, once we go to the enterprise level, OAuth starts becoming much worse. Say a boss has his secretary manage his calendar for him, which is a very common scenario. In many OAuth setups, he cannot enter his Calendar credentials into the company-wide calendaring software running on a secure company server, which the secretary can then access. Rather, he would need to enter it directly in the browser the secretary uses, and stay there checking off many options. Also it is common that OAuth implementations are using security tokens which expire, meaning the boss will need to keep reentering his Calendar credentials again and again. Most bosses will just get fed up and give his secretary his credentials, especially if he's not physically near his secretary. It is also likely that the secretary will then write the password down. This gets compounded if multiple secretaries manage his schedule.

Now say an organization has software for which it would like to run background processes for all its users with Calendar. Perhaps every week it would like to automatically analyze the Calendar accounts of all department chiefs to find a good time for a weekly meeting. How would this work exactly? Every department chief would now have to go and enter their credentials into this software? Then do it again each time security tokens expire from past authentications?


Of course this is only the beginning. Since OAuth was designed for the likes of Twitter and Facebook which cater to individual personal accounts, the common implementations do not allow for hierarchical permissions as enterprise organizations need.

In enterprise infrastructure, software is already used which has well defined roles and access rights for ever single user. This infrastructure should be deciding who can do what, and to what level one user can act on behalf of another user. Once an organization purchases accounts for all their employees from Calendar, no employee should be able to turn off or limit what the enterprise management software can do with their Calendar account. The enterprise management software is the one who needs to make such decisions. This flies in the face of Untrusted software should not have full access to a user's account, but only limited access as defined by the user and A user should be able to revoke the permission they granted to allow particular untrusted software to work.

The amount of work involved to tightly integrate Calendar with existing infrastructure is also enormous from a user perspective. Every single account now has to have a user navigate across web pages and check all kinds of boxes until all the users are integrated. OAuth implementations generally forget to have administrator accounts which can do everything on behalf of other users in their organization.

It should be obvious at this point whether enterprise organizations would be willing to purchase accounts for their entire staff with Calendar, when integration into their existing infrastructure or new endeavors with the service will be difficult if not outright impossible. Imagine how much money Calendar sales now stand to lose from being unattractive to enterprise clients.

Repel third party developers

OAuth implementations also generally require that any software which uses their APUIs be preregistered in advance. This places extra burden on third party developers. The OAuth implementations also commonly require that the third party web site integrating be preregistered in advance, so you can say goodbye to your application being compatible with staging servers which may be at another URL. It also makes software much less attractive when one party sells software to another party, as every new client now needs to go through an application registration process for the URLs they plan to setup the software they are purchasing. Therefore third party developers are less likely to be interested in selling software which integrates with Calendar, as there's hassle involved with every single sale.

Recap

  • OAuth is not a standard, but a set of ideas, which does not allow third party developers to reuse knowledge, and places extra documentation burden on implementers.
  • OAuth as a whole has undefined security characteristics.
  • OAuth doesn't properly fulfill its primary security objectives.
  • OAuth doesn't work well outside social networking web site use-cases.
  • OAuth services are unattractive to enterprise organizations looking to integrate such services into their infrastructure.
  • OAuth services are less likely to have professional third parties sell software based upon them.


Solutions


If you're looking to implement authorization for your API, I recommend to sticking with well understood secure designs, such as HTTP Basic Authentication over SSL/TLS (or HTTP Digest Authentication).

In order to achieve a situation where users can securely authorize third party software, without giving over their personal credentials (passwords), I recommend that these services have a page where they can generate new credentials (keys) which the user can copy and paste. They can then name these keys themselves (avoiding application registration hassle), and set permissions upon them themselves. Since the user is the one initiating the key creation, and copying and pasting it themselves, they cannot fall prey to a man-in-the-middle attack where the third party software initiates the authorization process.

But remember the use-cases described here, and ensure that organizations have a way to access all user accounts company-wide, and without individual users being able to disable or limit that access.

Conclusion


If you want your service to be used by everyone out there, be well supported by third parties, and to have them create all kinds of interesting software with it, do not use OAuth.

Even the original social networking sites behind OAuth decided they really need other options for different use-cases, such as Twitter's xAuth, or Yahoo offering Direct OAuth, which turns the entire scheme into a more complicated version of HTTP Basic Authentication, with no added benefits. Perhaps the most damaging point against OAuth, is that the original designer behind it decided to remove his name from the specification, and is washing his hands clean of it.

I find it really amazing at how blind many big players are these days to all the problems with OAuth. When I first heard that IBM, a major enterprise player started offering services only accessible with typical utterly crippled OAuth, I was overcome with disbelief. Yet at the same time, I hear that they're wondering why they're not seeing the sales they used to with other services they offer, or compared to the competition.

I'm even more amazed to see other big companies throwing away their currently working authentication systems for OAuth. Followed by them wondering why many third party developers are not upgrading to support the new authentication scheme, and clients jumping ship to inferior services.

It seems many developers and managers out there simply don't get it. If you know anyone like that, show them this article.